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The onion router (Tor) is a software that provides an opportunity to access the blocked 
content over the Internet. It also provides anonymity to its users with the help of a protocol 
called Hidden Service (HS) protocol. It provides the ability to the users to conduct 
confidential communication without the possibility of getting trace back. It allows the 
operators to publish anonymous content without compromising their anonymity.  
The ‘.onion’ address can only be accessed using Tor browser. To access the HS with a 
regular Internet browser, for example, Google Chrome, Firefox etc., a service called 
Tor2web is used. It is a proxy server, which receives the user’s request and forwards it to 
the targeted HS. The main issue identified in this service is that the service is not end-to-
end secure and is prone to various attacks including content injection and content 
modification. 
One of the possible solutions to this problem is to make an HTTPS connection directly to 
the onion site, rather than decrypting the packet at the intermediate node. This could make 
the communication secure from the user’s browser until termination at the onion site i.e. 
makes it end-to-end secure. This is achievable with the deployment of TLS’s Server 
Name Indication (SNI), which identifies the server name in the initial request. 
The idea is to register a domain name and add an ‘A’ and ‘AAAA’ records and get a valid 
certificate from the certificate authority. Then create a hidden service and obtain its onion 
address. Map an onion:domain address and obtain a valid certificate for it. Modify the 
SNI script file according to the requirements and update the ‘Table’ field in the script. 
Finally, choose a virtual port and delegate the onion service name and all subsequent 
packets to the targeted hidden service.  
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1. INTRODUCTION   
Today is the era of science and technology, and the enormous advancement in the field 
of information technology has led the Internet spread all around the world. The number 
of Internet users these days are more than 3 billion [1] and this figure is increasing day 
by day. Internet consists of an interconnected computer network connected using 
standardized communication protocols and thus forming a global network. World Wide 
Web invented in 1991 at CERN [2] consists of HTML and HTTP protocols used by the 
browsers to communicate with the servers. The Web is certainly a way of exchanging 
information over the Internet backbone. Interestingly, the Internet is divided into two 
parts, surface web and deep web internet [3]. 
The surface web also called visible web is the part of the Internet, commonly available to 
the public. The surface web is anything searchable using any search engine e.g. Google, 
Bing etc. These include the websites like Social websites, Blogs etc. or any such domains 
searchable by the search engines that end in ‘.com’, ‘.org’ or similar variations. Although 
many users use the surface web on the daily basis, it is interesting to know the fact that it 
only consumes 4% of the total web. Yes, it is true that only a small portion of the Internet 
web is available to the public, the rest is deep web. It is like an iceberg, which has small 
part above the surface of the water and generally has a larger percentage (around 91%) 
below the water [3].  
Larger portion of the Internet is the deep web, which is not visible to the public. Search 
engines cannot index the deep web content. It includes the content that is generally 
important and private. For example, the content stored on the Google drive, bank account 
details, population index number and much more, unless it is shared on the surface web. 
Moreover, there are some secret contents kept hidden from the public, including criminal 
records stored in a database by police or security agencies like FBI, CIA. To access the 
content in the deep web, an authorized form with valid input values is required. For 
example, to access the bank account, the user has to authorize himself using provided 
authentication methods and upon successful verification, the user gets certain rights to 
access the account details. 
There is another small portion of the deep web called dark web, which the search engines 
cannot index. This part of the deep web is not similar to the rest, although it is also 
indexable, it uses separate network within the Internet to reach the target website. It can 
be a small peer-to-peer network, or a large network like Tor, Freenet, and I2P, operated 
by individuals and public organizations. The users of darknet usually refer to a regular 
web as a ‘Clearnet’, because it is unencrypted in nature [4]. Unlike Clearnet, the Tor dark 
web has the top-level domain ends with ‘.onion’ whereas I2P has ‘.i2p’. 
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1.1 Motivation 
Anonymity means that the real person behind the message is unknown. A common variant 
of anonymity is pseudonym [5], which shows another name in place of a real name. 
Sometimes, the reason behind it is to show that the same person is behind different 
messages. Another variant is ‘deception’ in which the person behind, tries to impersonate 
different authority or expertise. 
Back in history, America’s farmers in 1787 published their arguments anonymously to 
argue for its constitution [6]. Similarly, many secret documents released, related to 
corruption and other mishaps during current and in previous years. The source is still 
unknown to these publications and investigation is still in process. Some of the biggest 
leaks in recent years [7] includes Panama papers, The Guantanamo Files, Cablegate and 
much more.      
The dark web is only accessible using specific software e.g. Tor and I2P. Tor’s Hidden 
Service also known as onion service is anonymously accessible only by using Tor browser 
bundle. Tor browser also provides access to the Clearnet content that is otherwise blocked 
or inaccessible using regular internet browser e.g. Chrome, Firefox etc. Essentially, Tor 
provides end-to-end anonymity in case of browsing HS using Tor browser, but to browse 
Clearnet domain, Tor does not guarantee end-to-end anonymity i.e. the HS operator 
remains anonymous but the client accessing the service is not anonymous. Although the 
Tor browser builds a circuit of encrypted connections through relays and extends one hop 
at a time, the exit node may reveal some information useful for the eavesdropper. The 
user (sender) may remain anonymous to the service [8]; however, the user’s credentials 
may still be required to connect to the server. 
The onion websites are also accessible without the use of Tor browser bundle. A proxy 
server called Tor2web handles the requests received from the regular Internet browser 
and forwards it to the requested HS. Tor2web proxy server has the Tor installed on it and 
the user does not require any installation on the system. This could be an advantage for 
the users, who do not want identification of any Tor related activity on their system. It is 
also useful because, the end users do not require any specific software to access the HS, 
rather a regular browser could retrieve the HS content. It helps anonymous publishing to 
reach a wider audience.  
The use of Tor2web proxy for retrieving hidden content has a disadvantage, which could 
lead to several threats.  The communication between the user agent (browser) and the Tor 
HS using Tor2web proxy lacks anonymity and security. The user agent encrypts the user’s 
request and forwards it to the Tor2web proxy server. The Tor2web proxy server decrypts 
the received request and identifies the onion hostname. The proxy server then forms an 
onion circuit to the targeted HS and relays the user’s request to it. Also, the data sent back 
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from the HS to the Tor2web proxy is already decrypted [8]. Thus, the Tor2web instance 
could possibly tamper the content transferred between the user agent and the onion site. 
Based on the limitations associated with the Tor2web proxy server in forwarding the 
user’s requests to the Tor HS, TLS’s Server Name Indication (SNI) extension is, 
therefore, more suitable in relaying the user’s requests securely to the HS. TLS’s SNI 
extension indicates the name of the server (target HS in this case) at the beginning of the 
TLS handshake process, the user agent is trying to reach. Therefore, the user’s request 
remains encrypted from the user agent until termination at the requested HS. 
1.2 Problem Statement 
The aim of this thesis work is to design and test a service that could provide access to the 
onion sites using regular Internet browser. There is already a proxy service Tor2web in 
use, which provides access to the onion sites on the surface web. The major drawback of 
this service is that it is not end-to-end secure and trustworthy. All the communication 
passing through is transparent to this service. Even if the browser encrypts the message 
earlier, the service decrypts the message and forwards it accordingly. The end users have 
to rely on this service and have to bear the risk of attacks such as message tampering and 
content injection. 
This thesis work uses Tor network to build a service that provides end-to-end encryption 
to its users. The SNI proxy forwards the user’s request directly to the target onion site 
without any alteration. This could make it secure and therefore trustworthy for the users, 
which increases its use by the public. To enhance the trust of the users, pinning techniques 
are useful and therefore can be used. 
1.3 Structure of the work 
The thesis starts with the review of Tor hidden service and related work. The literature 
review revealed more about the architecture of the Tor, its working methodology, and 
current deployment. Anonymity tools and services chapter discusses different available 
anonymity networks and their working. Furthermore, Chapter 3 discusses the Transport 
Layer Security protocol and its additive features including HTTP Strict Transport 
Security and HTTP Public Key Pinning. Chapter 4 is about the TLS certificate authorities 
and validation practices at different levels i.e. domain level, organization level and 
extended level. It also highlights chosen certificate authority. Chapter 5 is about the tools 
used and the implementation procedure as well as the results obtained with a brief 
description. Chapter 6 includes the analysis section and conclusion of the work.   
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2. Anonymity tools and services 
This chapter describes the latest available anonymity tools and related services they 
provide. It also describes the relationship of these tools with the traditional Internet. Tor’s 
Hidden Service and Tor2web proxy service are also discussed under this chapter.  
2.1 The Onion Routing (Tor) 
The onion routing abbreviated as Tor is a network of hidden nodes that act as a relay to 
protect the user’s privacy and data over the Internet. It is named ‘onion’ because the 
messages are encapsulated in layers of encryption, which resembles layers of an onion, in 
the application layer of the communication protocol stack. The Tor network is a group of 
free volunteer routers called relays that are deployed more than seven thousand [9] in 
numbers, which are used for directing the Internet traffic and thus concealing the user’s 
location and usage. Tor also provides the option to the sender and the receiver to keep 
their identity hidden from each other or the initiator disclose the identity or vice versa. In 
this situation, the sender and the receiver may know each other but are hidden from others 
on the network. In the Tor network, each chosen hop is encrypted until the exit node, thus 
making it difficult and challenging the attackers conducting the network surveillance, to 
break the network and steal or use the shared information. It makes it challenging to track 
back the user’s Internet activity (website visited, instant messaging etc.) through its 
network [10]. Tor network also helps the users to access the blocked content, which is 
otherwise not accessible on the Internet. Besides keeping the user’s privacy safe and 
secure, Tor also intends to keep the user’s Internet activities safe from monitoring. 
From individuals to the big organizations and Law enforcement agencies, Tor is 
increasingly becoming the need of everyone. Individuals use Tor to keep their information 
private from the websites they visit, the information they exchange with their family 
members or friends through instant messaging, also to visit the websites that are blocked 
by the local Internet providers. Tor also provides the users the ground for sharing socially 
sensitive communication [10]. The non-governmental organizations, whose workers are 
working in some foreign countries use Tor network to hide the actual location of the 
worker(s) and the organization. There are many other corporations and organizations like 
Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) and Indymedia, who recommend using Tor in order 
to safeguard their members’ online privacy and security [11]. Some of the corporations 
recommend Tor over traditional VPN because the traditional VPN reveals the information 
about the time spent on the communication and the amount of communication that 
happened. Similarly, the law enforcement agencies use Tor for surfing the websites 
without leaving the government IP addresses in their weblogs [10]. 
Tor does not completely solve the issue of anonymity [11] and is not even designed to 
completely erase the fingerprints, but instead, reduces the risk of being traced back by 
focusing only on protecting the transfer of data. Many individuals and groups also use 
Tor to gain access to censored information, by keeping their identity anonymous, so that 
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they could carry out some political activities against the state etc. Tor has been named as 
the dark web in relation to Bitcoin and Silk Road [12]. It has been targeted by several 
security agencies and British National Crime agency remains more successful in gaining 
access to the Tor network showing that the anonymity of the network is not bulletproof, 
but of course, brings lots of hurdles and difficulties while breaking into the network [13]. 
Tor has gained popularity over the years and now millions of users prefer using Tor for 
their daily Internet surfing.   
2.2 Traditional Internet and Tor 
In traditional Internet communication, when two parties are communicating with each 
other, their connection is established directly [8] with each other through several nodes in 
the Internet cloud and the same channel is used for both sending and receiving of the 
packets unless some node disappears from the Internet cloud. If the established link is 
normal i.e. HTTP, then the sender and the receiver, both have the information about each 
other and even the eavesdropper who is observing the link may know that these two 
parties are communicating with each other and the information they are sharing with each 
other. However, if the communication link uses HTTPS, then the eavesdropper who is 
observing the link may know the two parties communicating with each other, but does 
not know the actual communication carried. This is because the actual payload sent from 
the sender to the receiver and vice versa is encrypted using encryption techniques 
(symmetric and asymmetric) and sent over the secure link. This way the communication 
remains safe, but the eavesdropper is still accessible to some information about the sender 
and/or the receiver i.e. the identity of the user, geographical location of the user, IP 
address and the sites visited by the user etc.  
 
  
Figure 2.1: Traditional Internet communication 
There are several technologies that may be helpful in dodging the eavesdropper by 
providing them false information, for example, use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) is 
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helpful in publishing different public IP address to the eavesdropper, which may show 
different geographical location of the user [14].  There are several benefits of VPN over 
other technologies including the use of encrypted tunnels for the data transfer and masking 
the user’s real public IP with one that is different and foremost the connection is fast. 
However, there are still some public entities in the network e.g. VPN server, who may 
know the user’s actual IP address and other information of the user. Since the VPN, 
providers may have the information about the user, so the security agencies may ask to 
share the information with them and help them in tracing back to the user in some 
situations. Therefore, the user is still identifiable and reachable. 
The Tor network, on the other hand, is an independent network. It not only secures the 
communication that is being done between the sender and the receiver but also hides the 
user’s details from others within the network [11]. Therefore, it is quite hard for the 
middleman to identify the information that is being shared and trace back the user’s details 
[10]. This is the main reason for choosing Tor network as part of my Thesis work. As 
discussed earlier, the Tor network does not provide complete protection and not even 
other similar deep web networks, but secures most of the part and provides challenges to 
the middleman to get into the network [13]. 
The earlier paragraph briefly explained the basic analogy of the Tor network, which 
clarifies the basic concept of the Tor network. Getting deep into the Tor network, the 
mathematical analogy of the Tor network will be observed, which will explain the 
practical working of the network and will further discuss the possibilities of keeping the 
user’s information secret.   
The Tor network consists of nodes also called relay nodes, expanded throughout the 
world, used further for transmission of packets from source to destination and vice versa. 
 
Figure 2.2 (a): Communication through Tor network 
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As mentioned earlier, a source computer selects some nodes from the list of Tor network 
database. To make it clear and understand the practicality of the Tor network, the 
following example explains the concept. Let’s say there are two parties Alice and Bob 
(example names used in cryptography), where Alice wants to communicate with Bob over 
the Tor network [11]. Before Alice and Bob start communicating with each other, Alice’s 
computer will select few of the random nodes from the Tor database. Essentially, to 
enhance the security level and build the anonymity, Alice’s computer will negotiate in 
succession shared cryptographic keys with the selected nodes at each level. The main 
thing here is that the key negotiation process is in succession so that aside from the first 
node the rest of the nodes are not aware of Alice’s involvement. Therefore, if three 
random nodes are chosen then the first node will be entry node, the second node will be 
middle node and the third node will be the exit node [8]. In this scenario, Alice would 
essentially get three session keys generated from these random nodes. Let’s say she got 
session key ‘k1’ from entry node, then got key ‘k2’ because of negotiating with middle 
node and the key ‘k3’ after negotiating with the exit node. This session key ‘k3’ is also 
responsible for validating that the data coming into the Tor proxy is the same data being 
sent out of the exit node [10]. Now Alice will encrypt the message with each of these 
keys. For example, encrypting the message M with key K1 will generate a ciphertext C1. 
The second node will take the ciphertext C1 and re-encrypt with key K2 and generates 
C2. Similarly, the encryption process for ciphertext C2 with key K3 will generate 
ciphertext C1. 
 
Figure 2.2 (b) Message encryption at each Tor node with different keys 
Therefore, at each session of key negotiation, each node will think that it is 
communicating only with its predecessor node, but indirectly it will be communicating 
with the originator i.e. Alice. The technique behind the generation of the keys is the 
combination of Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [11] with some techniques of 
public key encryption after which Alice will be able to have three different keys. The 
connection drops unless the complete Tor relay circuit is established. 
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Figure 2.2 (c): Key origination at each chosen onion router 
Once the Tor circuit is completed, it will look like a telescopic form of tunnels that unwrap 
much like the layers of an onion after which Alice will be able to send data to Bob. Now, 
when Alice forwards the data to Bob through the Tor browser, her computer will wrap 
the data into three layers of encryption using the same three different session keys 
generated before. Each node will unwrap one layer of it and forwards the packet to the 
next node. Here, the first two nodes will only see that they need to forward the packet to 
the next Tor node, but the last node will see that the packet is intended for Bob, so the 
packet will exit the Tor network and be forwarded to Bob [10]. Therefore, it also 
eliminates the traces of the path followed towards the destination, making it harder to 
diagnose the actual source of the packet and the path the data traveled. If Bob sends data 
to Alice, the same process is followed, but with a selection of different Tor nodes and 
each node will have different session key as well. 
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Figure 2.2 (d): Packet from source to destination 
However, if the data sent to the Tor proxy from the computer is unencrypted, then it will 
also be unencrypted after leaving the exit node. So, if there is some sensitive information 
i.e. username/password etc. anyone listening at the exit node or on the link between the 
exit node and the destination, will be able to detect the information and may use it as a 
piece of data to figure out who you are. Similarly, if someone installs third-party 
applications e.g. multimedia, java etc. which may not be configured to use Tor proxy, 
then the server who is interested in identifying your identity, may request to load specific 
kinds of multi-media files, which may require your browser to bypass the Tor proxy and 
run the application over the regular Internet [15]. This way the user will no longer remain 
anonymous and the source will be easily identifiable. 
2.3 Tor Hidden Service   
As discussed earlier, Tor provides various kinds of services, from the web services to 
instant messaging services making it possible for users to stay anonymous. Other Tor 
users may connect to these hidden services using Tor rendezvous points without having 
knowledge about other networks [11]. The rendezvous point is a meeting point, which 
allows P2P network peers to find each other. 
Initially, to get the hidden service known to the client, the hidden service needs to 
advertise its existence in the Tor network. To do that the server selects some random 
nodes, which act as introduction points and builds circuits to them.  The server shares its 
public key with the chosen random nodes so that they act as an introduction point for the 
server. To keep the identity of the server anonymous, the link between the server and the 
introduction points are linked using Tor circuit, rather than direct connection making it 
hard for anyone to associate an introduction point to the server’s IP address [8]. 
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After selecting the introduction points, the hidden service assembles the descriptor, which 
includes the public key and the summary of chosen introduction points [11]. The hidden 
service than signs this descriptor with its private key and uploads the descriptor to the 
database. It produces the ‘dot onion’ address, further used by the client to reach the hidden 
service. The client gets this knowledge by connecting with the Tor database that has the 
descriptor uploaded by the hidden service. Once the client finds the descriptor of the ‘dot 
onion’ address, it will know about the introduction points and the public key of the hidden 
service. 
The client also creates its own circuit with another random node, with which it shares its 
one-time secret (cookie), so that it acts as a rendezvous point. This rendezvous point will 
be helpful in establishing communication between the client and the server later. The 
client assembles an introduce message, including the rendezvous point and one-time 
secret and forwards it to one of the introduction points requesting it to be delivered to the 
hidden service [11]. The introduction point forwards this message to the hidden service, 
which decrypts the message and creates a circuit with the rendezvous point. After creating 
the circuit with the rendezvous point, the hidden service sends its one-time secret to the 
client in a rendezvous message and establishes a connection. 
Once the connection is successfully established, the rendezvous point notifies the client 
about it. Now both the client and the hidden service can communicate with each other by 
using their circuits to the rendezvous point. The rendezvous point only relays the 
messages between the client and the service. One of the reasons for using the rendezvous 
point for communication instead of introduction points is that no single relay should 
appear to be responsible for the given hidden service [11]. 
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Figure 2.3: Tor Hidden Service [8] 
2.4 Tor2web Proxy 
Internet users who do not use or do not have access to Tor web browser bundle can still 
access the hidden services without using any Tor bundle software. Tor2web proxy [16] is 
an HTTP proxy that makes it possible for these users to access the hidden service ‘dot 
onion’ address without using Tor browser. The Tor2web service downgrades the 
anonymity of the user and lets them know by giving a warning message that the user is 
no longer anonymous and suggests downloading and using the Tor browser bundle if the 
user wants to stay anonymous. Like Tor, Tor2web also provides proxy based on the 
community integration [17]. Anyone can start and host the Tor2web proxy and relay the 
packets further to the network. 
During the early stages of its development, Tor2web architecture was based on one 
domain, one wildcard digital certificates shared among trusted people [18]. Until now, 
the same architecture is being in use but there are some scalability issues in the current 
architecture. 
- Because of single DNS, the service might be unavailable during maintenance 
or in case the service is down. 
- There is only one digital certificate shared among only trusted people. 
- A single person is managing the DNS server. 
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In the near future, Tor2web’s architecture is going to have some changes and 
accommodates the scalability issues that are discussed above [18]. The targeted issues are 
as follows: 
- There will be multiple administrators managing the network using multiple 
domains. 
- There will be multiple certificates so that it can be shared among a group of 
people. 
- It will support multiple DNS servers. 
There are several features of Tor2web proxy and some of the current main features are 
listed below: 
- It allows the blocking of illegal content. 
- Keep the blocklist in hash format and not in the clear text. 
- Only proxies the onion URLs and not the others. 
- Requests are proxied transparently from the Internet to Tor hidden services. 
- Contains standard template for errors. 
In situations, where the user is unable to reach torproject.org, then the user can use an 
extra feature of Tor2web proxy called GetTor [18] which provides the user an alternative 
to downloading the Tor browser.   
2.5 Invisible Internet Project (I2P) 
Invisible Internet Project (I2P) which initially began in 2003 [19] is an open-source 
project like the Tor project and its main purpose is also to provide anonymity over the 
Internet, supporting secure and anonymous communication. Most of the project is written 
in Java (1.5+) but some of the third-party applications have been written in Python and 
other languages [19]. I2P was designed as a true “Darknet” and functions as a “network 
within a network” meaning that the outbound relays either do not exist or few of those 
which exist are rarely usable, so keeping the traffic within the network. I2P provides 
control over the tradeoffs between the anonymity, reliability, bandwidth usage, and 
latency to its users [19]. The integrity, security, and anonymity of the system are never 
compromised by I2P and dynamic reconfiguration support of the network helps to keep 
the system safe and secure from various vulnerable attacks. 
I2P, unlike other anonymous networks, provides end-to-end anonymity. It does not 
provide anonymity by just hiding the sender and not the receiver or the way around, but 
it hides the identity of both the sender and the receiver. Therefore, the peers 
communicating with each other using I2P network are anonymous and unidentifiable to 
each other and to third parties. Currently, I2P allows anonymous web publishing or 
hosting as well as HTTP proxying i.e. the publishers can host their websites using the I2P 
network as well as the clients who can browse the Internet using an I2P proxy. This will 
not only keep the user’s information safe but also the communication happening between 
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them will be safe from leaking. The traffic over the Clearnet is quite likely to be monitored 
and prone to malicious attacks. For example, even if the user is using HTTPS to browse 
the website, the middleman or the hacker and many other middle entities may see some 
information that is exchanged between the client and the server and that information may 
be helpful for the middleman to monitor your web surfing or use of the Internet. 
There are three key concepts to understand the operation of I2P. The first concept is “strict 
separation of the router and the endpoints”. The concept behind it is to hide the details of 
the user and the server. The second important concept is the use of “tunnel”. The tunnels 
used in I2P are uni-directional tunnels. It uses two separate tunnels, each for sending and 
receiving a message. The tunnel is made through an explicitly selected list of routers [12]. 
I2P uses layer encryption concept similar to Tor but it layers like garlic. At each point of 
the router, one layer is decrypted and the rest of the packet is forwarded to the next router’s 
IP address. Each tunnel has two points, one is start point (gateway) and the other is end-
point. Every tunnel can get a message from any other user at its start point and further it 
delivers it to the end-point. The third critical concept is the use of I2P’s “network 
database”. There are two types of metadata that are carried; “routerInfo” and “leaseSets” 
[19]. The “routerInfo” has information about the list of I2P routers and leaseSets has the 
information about the destinations. These are the three main concepts that I2P uses in 
combination to get the users connected and share the information with each other.  
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3. Transport Layer Security and its additive 
features 
SSL, developed by Netscape, was one of the early cryptographic protocols used to secure 
communication over computer networks. Due to serious security flaws in SSL 1.0, the 
version was never published (was not introduced commercially) but later in 1995 SSL 2.0 
was released [20]. There were also several flaws in that version of SSL, which ultimately 
led to the design of SSL 3.0. As of 2014, SSL 3.0 is considered insecure, as it is vulnerable 
to various online attacks. TLS was first defined in 1999 by IETF as an upgrade of SSL 
3.0 [21]. The latest version of TLS is 1.3, which is still a working draft and is incomplete 
but includes many differences from 1.2. This thesis work uses TLS version 1.2, which 
has TLS SNI extension. 
TLS provides privacy and data integrity between the two communicating applications. 
The key difference that makes the TLS more secure and efficient from SSL is the support 
of newer security algorithms, supported cipher suites, message authentication and key 
generation through the process of handshaking [22]. TLS is a widely deployed security 
protocol and has its applications in Web browsers, VPN connections, VoIP and other data 
transferring applications [22]. 
There are two primary layers of TLS protocol, the TLS record protocol, and TLS 
handshake protocol. 
3.1 TLS Record protocol 
The record protocol works at a lower level, layered [22] on top of some reliable transport 
protocols e.g. TCP. The protocol provides security to the communicating connection 
making sure to keep the privacy and reliability of the connection. For encryption of the 
data, a symmetric key encryption [22] technique is used e.g. AES, RC4, etc. Since the 
protocol uses symmetric key encryption, the keys generated for the connection are unique 
for each connection and based on the secret negotiated by TLS handshake protocol. 
Reliability of the connection depends on the integrity check using the keyed MAC. For 
MAC computation, secure hash functions are used e.g. SHA-1, etc. 
The record layer function can be called at any time after the handshake process is finished 
[22] when there is need of communication. The record protocol encapsulates various 
higher-level protocols such as the TLS handshake protocol.    
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3.2 TLS Handshake protocol 
Before the actual communication starts and the application protocol starts sending or 
receiving the data, the protocol allows the client and the server to authenticate each other, 
negotiate the algorithms and the cryptographic keys to be used. The TLS handshake 
protocol [22] provides three basic properties of connection security: 
- Asymmetric cryptography i.e. RSA, DSA, etc. used for authentication process 
- Keeping the shared secret secure, i.e. the negotiated private key is unavailable to 
eavesdroppers or attackers. 
- The communication is reliable so that the message is exchanged without any 
alterations. 
During the initial stage, when the client wants to start a communication with the server, 
the client sends a ‘Client Hello’ message to the server. The ‘Hello’ message includes 
cryptographic information such as version number of TLS/SSL, the cipher suites 
supported by the client and a random byte string used for computation. Once the server 
receives the ‘Client Hello’ message, it replies with the ‘Server Hello’ message. It includes 
the information about the particular suite it chooses and the TLS version number. The 
server also sends its certificate including the public key along with the ‘Hello’ message 
to the client. 
Client upon receiving the certificate from the server verifies it and extracts the server’s 
public key. The verification process may include, checking of the digital signature, the 
certificate chain, and validity period of the certificate, including the activation and expiry 
dates and the cancellation status of the certificate. The client uses the public key to encrypt 
a new key called ‘pre-master key’and sends it to the server. The server decrypts the ‘pre-
master key’ with its private key. At this stage, if the client receives the “client certificate 
request” from the server, then the client sends a random byte string encrypted with the 
client’s private key along with the client’s digital certificate. The server verifies the 
client’s certificate upon receipt. 
The client sends an encrypted message to the server requesting the server to check the 
message by decrypting it and verify if it is up to the specifications. This is the ‘finished 
message’ from the client side indicating that the communication onward will be encrypted 
with the shared secret key. The server decrypts and verifies the message and if everything 
is normal, the server replies with the ‘finished message’ too, requesting the client to 
decrypt and verify the message content. The server also indicates that the communication 
exchanged onward will be encrypted with the shared secret key. The communication 
between the client and the server is therefore, encrypted and authenticated for the whole 
session until either side terminates the session. 
16 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The complete overview of the TLS handshake protocol [22] 
The TLS handshake itself uses asymmetric encryption i.e. one ‘public’ and one ‘private’ 
key. The message is encrypted using public key and decrypted using private. Since 
asymmetric encryption has higher overhead, therefore, it is not suitable for providing real-
time security. Thus, the asymmetric encryption is used during handshake only to allow 
setting up and exchanging newly created ‘shared key’. Once the session is established 
[23], the session itself uses symmetric encryption which makes the secure connection 
feasible in real-time.  
3.3 HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) 
HSTS is a web security feature that helps to protect websites against different attacks such 
as man-in-the-middle attack, cookies hijacking and protocol downgrade attacks [24]. This 
simple website security feature forces the websites to communicate with servers through 
HTTPS connection instead of HTTP only. HSTS is an IETF standard track protocol and 
is specified in RFC 6797 [25]. The specification was submitted as an Internet draft on 17 
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June 2010, but the specification name was altered from “Strict Transport Security” to 
“HTTP Strict Transport Security” because the specification applies only to HTTP [25]. 
Since, HTTP is a simple transport protocol, which does not provide any encryption for 
the payload it takes from source to the destination, so any data or web page delivered over 
HTTP connections will expose users to security risks. The risks may include the 
manipulation of the data or information of the sender and or receiver, stealing the login 
credentials information, forwarding or redirecting to insecure or malicious websites and 
many others. This kind of interception cannot be detected since the HTTP response looks 
the same as the genuine response [26]. 
HSTS forces all the data to be passed through HTTPS connection instead of plain text 
HTTP, thus making the entire channel encrypted before sending the data and less possible 
for the attacker to attack the channel and steal the information during the transmission. 
 
Figure 3.2: HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS) 
To enable HSTS on a server the following HSTS response header must be added in an 
HTTPS reply: 
For example: 
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16070400; includeSubdomain 
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The max-age parameter is in seconds and this specifies the time the browser should 
connect to the server using the HTTPS connection. ‘IncludeSubdomain’ specifies that the 
browser uses the HTTPS connection for the existing and the future subdomains. 
Now, when the browser accesses the website, the server replies with the HSTS response 
header. The web browser will then remember to use the HTTPS connection for the 
specified age i.e. max-age. During the specified max-age period, the browser will even 
upgrade the HTTP request to the HTTPS so the website is accessible on a secure link. For 
example, if the user types http://www.testnetwork1.tk or simply writes testnetwork1.tk, 
the browser will upgrade it to https://testnetwork1.tk. Once the specified max-age expires, 
the browser will start accessing the website normally through HTTP, unless the user 
specifies HTTPS in the link. 
Almost, all of the popular web browsers support HSTS and some maintain the HSTS 
preload list that automatically informs the browser which websites are accessible through 
HTTPS. This is possible by adding a parameter ‘preload’ to the header and then adding 
the domain to the list. 
Strict-Transport-Security: max-age=16070400; includeSubdomain; preload 
 
Beside solving many problems, the most important security vulnerability that HSTS can 
fix is SSL-stripping or protocol downgrade attack [27]. Such attacks transparently convert 
the HTTPS connection into plain HTTP connection. Since many websites do not use 
TLS/SSL; therefore, there is no prior knowledge whether the plain HTTP is due to an 
attack or simply because of not implementing TLS/SSL on the website. Also, there are 
no warnings presented to the user during the downgrade process [27]. 
HSTS fixes this problem by informing the browser to always keep the connection HTTPS 
to the server. Although, this will limit the attack to some extent but has a few limitations, 
because if the user visits the site for the first time with HTTP, then the attacker may 
intercept the connection and steal the information. Most of the popular browsers have 
provided a solution to this problem by including a ‘pre-loaded’ list of HSTS sites but 
unfortunately, it cannot scale to include all the websites on the Internet [27]. In addition, 
since the HSTS is time-based, therefore it is sensitive to the attacks involving the shifting 
of time of the victim’s computer by using false NTP packets.   
3.4 HTTP Public Key Pinning (HPKP) 
Until now, the solution to minimize attacks on websites was to force browsers to use 
HTTPS. This technique discussed was HTTP Strict Transport Security (HSTS). Besides 
forcing the browsers to use HTTPS, it also mitigates Man-in-the-Middle attack. However, 
what if the Certificate Authority (CA) is compromised and the attacker starts miss-issuing 
the certificates for the websites; the browser will accept it implicitly without creating any 
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problems, as for the browser everything seems to be ok and valid because that CA will 
be in its list of trust. If the attacker succeeds in doing this, it can create a lot of issues and 
it is very hard to provide a real-time solution. Although, there are certain methods 
discussed in the Certificate Transparency topic to overcome these issues in real-time, 
sometimes it might take months to diagnose the problem. 
HPKP provides the solution for mitigating the MIM attack by eliminating the generation 
of bogus and rogue certificates. It is a security policy which is delivered via HTTP 
response header [28] just like HSTS and CSP (Content Security Policy). The main 
purpose of the HPKP is to allow the host to deliver a set of fingerprints to the User Agent 
(UA) about the cryptographic identities (TLS certificate) it should accept in the future. 
This way, it will accept only those identities fingerprinted and allows them going forward. 
It may reject any change found at any point. To make it more secure, the better way is to 
include the fingerprints of your current TLS certificate and at least one backup [29]. 
Certain security analysts suggest backing up the Certificate Signing Request (CSR) 
fingerprints in order to avoid purchasing of the backup certificate. So, at any stage, if the 
certificate’s key is ever compromised, this CSR could sign a new public key. This can be 
done by creating the CSR with a brand-new RSA key pair and must be stored securely 
offline [30]. This way, it is easy to switch to the new certificate, since the fingerprint of 
the CSR is already in the HPKP header. Therefore, if the hacker compromises the CA and 
issues a rogue certificate for any domain, the browser that had an HPKP header in a 
response will not accept it. 
The broader example could be a bank which always has a certificate from some authorized 
CA, say CA company A. In today’s world, any CA authority can create certificate for that 
bank, say CA Company B or CA Company C since they all have a valid trust path and 
the browser will accept it without issuing any warnings. But, if the bank implements 
HPKP and pin the first certificate issued by (company A), then the browser will not accept 
other certificates issued or generated by other CA authorities, like in this case CA 
authority B and CA authority.   
3.5 HPKP Response Header 
HPKP response header has the following format: 
Public-Key-Pins: pin-sha256="base64=="; max-age=expireTime [; 
includeSubDomains][; report-uri="reportURI"] 
The Pin directive comes from the certificate that has information like the subject, issuer 
etc. It binds the public key with the identity. The identity in our case is testnetwork1.tk 
and the syntax of the Pin directive is as follow: 
pin-sha256=\"YLh1dUR9y6Kja30RrAn7JKnbQG/uEtLMkBgFF2Fuihg=\"; 
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pin-sha256=\"NKjQ9MVvj48l1/6nm5IqyV/WGZRAiuylkJo+2R0GetA=\"; 
 
The first one is the Public Key and the other is Backup key, which is important to have in 
case the private key is compromised at any stage, then it can generate the new certificate. 
It is mandatory to keep the backup key offline and not at the same place where the private 
key is stored. 
According to the rules, the User Agent must ignore the pin-directives with tokens naming 
a hash algorithm it does not recognize [29]. The pin-directive name is case sensitive 
according to processing rules set by IETF. 
This max-age directive indicates how long you want the policy to be enforced, or in other 
words, during this period the UA should consider the host as a known pinned host. 
Initially, it is better to keep the max-age value smaller so that in case of incorrectly 
installed headers, or the invalid policy, the UA only remember it for a small number of 
seconds. 
In this thesis work, initially max-age 30 seconds is used and once it is tested and 
confirmed that the policy is working fine, then the max-age directive value can be 
increased to max. 
The syntax for the max-age directive is as follow: 
max-age = 30 
 
Beside these two directives, there are two more directives that are optional and are as 
follows: 
 
This includeSubdomain directive is an optional directive and if present and applied, tells 
the UA that the pinned domain and subsequent subdomains contain pinning policy. This 
ensures adequate security for domain level cookie. 
includeSubdomains'; 
 
The report-URI directive is also optional and it indicates where to post the report in case 
of PIN failure. The good idea is to set different host URI in the report-URI directive 
because if the domain is under attack there will be no valid connection between the user 
and the server due to MITM. The RFC also indicates that the client can try to send the 
reports later in case of report failure [28]. 
report-uri="https://report.testnetwork.tk"'; 
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4. TLS Certificate Authorities and Domain Name 
Validation Practices 
Certificates are an essential part of today Internet and they are the proof that the owner of 
a certain certificate is authentic and has passed different levels of 
examinations/challenges. This chapter focuses on the CA that provides the certificates to 
the domain owners and organizations. Besides that, it also discusses the popular digital 
certificates that are a part of this thesis work as well as the process of issuing the 
certificates to owners. 
4.1 Certificate Authority and Digital Certificates 
Security and privacy are essential parts of daily life and without it, the lives of the people 
will always be at risk and danger. Similarly, over the Internet, security also plays a vital 
role in making and enhancing the trust relationship between the user and the organization 
(website). Therefore, the trusted entity (authority) that deals with such matters is known 
as Certificate Authority. It is a trusted entity that issues an electronic document, which 
helps in identifying the identity of the digital entity over the Internet. The issued electronic 
document is thus known as a digital certificate and is an important part of Public Key 
Infrastructure (PKI) and secure communication [31]. The certificate may typically 
include the owner’s public key, expiration date of the certificate and other related 
information about the owner. Operating Systems (OSes) and Web Browsers maintain the 
list of trusted CA root certificates to verify certificates that a CA has issued and signed 
[32]. CAs issues millions of certificates each year to help secure critical information such 
as online transactions and information about the sender and/or receiver. 
Now, one can think about who decides a CA to be trusted. The CA can be trusted through 
an authorized process called CA membership program which is operated by browsers, 
operating systems and mobile devices [32]. In this program, the CA must meet detailed 
criteria to be accepted as a member [31]. Once the program accepts the CA as a member, 
the CA can issue SSL certificates transparently trusted by the browsers, operating systems 
and other devices relying on the certificate. The trusted relationship depends on the 
operational age of the CA, the longer the CA is operational, more browsers and other 
devices will trust the certificates issued by that CA. There are several CA and every 
device, browser or operating systems have their own policies of selecting the CA and 
make their own list of authorized CA. For example, Google Chrome web browser uses 
the certificates that are included with the Operating System [32]. Similarly, Firefox has a 
list of its own default authorized CAs e.g. Certum CA, Buypass Class 2 CA 1 and many 
others.   
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4.2 Let’s Encrypt 
Let’s Encrypt is a certificate authority that issues an authorized electronic document for 
securing websites for free. It uses an automated process to issue the certificate, rather than 
the manual procedure thus eliminating the complex process of validation, signing, 
installation and renewal of the certificate. The aim of the project was not only to eliminate 
the complexity of the system but also to provide TLS encryption at a very low cost, which 
would help in securing more and more websites on the Internet. Thus, now execution of 
only two commands would set up HTTPS encryption and acquire and install the 
certificate on the website in Linux web server [33]. The following is a figure that explains 
how the Let’s Encrypt authorization works. 
 
Figure 4.1 (a): Let's Encrypt Authorization process 
The agent authorizes the key pair, and once authorized, the rest is simple. To obtain the 
certificate for the domain “testnetwork1.tk” a Certificate Signing Request “CSR” is 
generated by the agent with a specified public key and sent to the Let’s Encrypt CA. 
Along with the public key, the agent includes the signature by the private key, so that the 
Let’s Encrypt CA knows it is an authorized key pair. Once the CA receives the request, 
it verifies the signature and if everything looks good, the certificate is issued for 
“testnetwork1.tk” with the public key from CSR. 
 
Figure 4.1 (b): Assigning certificate after authorization 
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Currently, Let’s Encrypt offers free domain validated SSL certificates but not the 
Extended Validation (EV). Domain validation is the lowest validation type, showing that 
the certificate holder has control over a particular domain [34]. Extended Validation (EV) 
certificates, on the other hand, are used for securing information that is critical and 
sensitive in nature and requires enough security to keep it safe from unauthorized users 
and attackers. This type requires a stringent set of security checks and is therefore 
implausible to offer for free. 
Let’s encrypt certificate authority is trusted by all major web browsers and cross-signed 
by IdenTrust [35]. It allows for anyone who wants a domain validated SSL certificate for 
HTTPS to easily have one free of charge by entering only a few commands.   
4.3 Certificate validation process 
Security is an essential part especially when it comes to websites and the Internet. Several 
types of websites are in use around the world nowadays. Some of the websites are basic 
ones i.e. blogs which are only used to convey information to the reader. Some of them 
provide online shopping services to clients and some hold very critical information about 
the user i.e. banks etc. Since, the level of each website varies based on the information it 
contains and the data it shares, the level of protection required by each website varies. 
Therefore, by looking at the requirements, there are several different types of certificates, 
each provides a certain level of protection and security to the websites and its clients. The 
level of verification also varies depending on the type of certificate requested. 
4.3.1 Domain Validation 
Domain Validated SSL certificates provide the basic level of security and therefore are 
the cheapest among other certificates. In this validation process, only the domain name 
of the website is authenticated and processed based on very little information gathered 
from the individual or the owner for authenticating the website/domain name [36]. Each 
certificate authority has its own rule for validating the domain name. Some authenticate 
the process just on the basis of user email address and some via call or through some other 
alternative methods. 
Let’s Encrypt provides domain validated certificates [37]. Before issuing the certificate 
for the certain domain name, the Let’s encrypt client queries some of the challenges from 
the individual to prove the information provided including country, location, zip code, 
and an email address along with additional question of choosing between the Easy and 
the advance usage (HTTP & HTTPS both or enforcing HTTPS) respectively. The email 
address is required for future communication in case of lost key recovery and/or notices 
of the validity of the certificate.   
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4.3.2 Extended validation 
To enhance the trust level of the users and make them sure about the legitimacy of the 
website they are visiting, the validation process can be carried out to the utmost level of 
validation; the extended validation. Not only, the domain name is validated during the 
process of authentication, the whole process is analyzed meticulously [38]. During the 
authentication process, the authority may require various documents confirming the 
legitimacy of the business beside the details of the certificate request. The Certificate 
Authority takes its time to verify the provided details and documents and issues the EV 
certificate to the owner of the domain upon clearance. 
For issuance of EV SSL certificates [38], the CA verifies the following measurements: 
• The domain owner must have domain control. The CA could verify WHOIS 
registration record for the domain. 
• The CA also verifies the applicant of the certificate. The applicant should be the 
same who has signed the contract. 
• The CA matches the name of the company provided in the certificate with the 
official company’s name. 
• Besides the verification of the company’s name, CA also verifies the address of 
the company in the state’s record with the one mentioned in the certificate. 
• Finally, before issuing the certificate, CA also verifies the contact information like 
telephone number and email address provided by the company in the certificate. 
 
To get the EV SSL certificate, one has to go through the strict authentication process of 
the CA and should provide complete details to the CA, so that the CA could allow the 
users to trust the website they are visiting.  
4.3.3 Organization validation 
The owner of the domain, who may be running a small organization, can also use more 
advanced validation services than simply the domain validation service, which helps the 
owner of the organization to promote the organization name that helps in marketing the 
business [36]. Besides the details about the domain name, the organization’s details are 
provided out by the owner, during the process of certificate authentication challenges. 
This acquired information about the organization is then embedded (the organization 
name) just beside the green padlock in the address bar when the user visits the website. 
The CA may verify the business through different means (by contacting the local 
authority) and if the authority fails to get the verification of the business then it may ask 
for further details from the owner of the business. Further information may include the 
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Business license or a tax number or bank statement etc. The personal business name 
cannot be used if the verification of the business fails. 
4.4 Certificate Transparency 
Enhancements in modern cryptography from the past few years have strengthened 
modern browser capabilities of detecting malicious websites that are provisioned with 
fake SSL certificates [39]. However, the modern cryptography is not capable of detecting 
any malicious websites, provisioned with mistakenly issued SSL certificates, or 
certificates maliciously acquired from an unimpeachable CA. In these situations, it is hard 
for the browser to detect any malicious and bogus information about the CA. The CA 
appears to be authentic and in good standing condition. Therefore, it gives the users an 
impression that the website is authentic and the connection is secure. 
Since there is currently no effective way to monitor or audit the certificates in real time 
[40], it takes sometimes a week or a month to possibly detect the maliciousness or 
bogusness of the certificate. The effect of these issues can be far ranging and harmful. 
Certificate Transparency helps in providing a solution to these certificate-based threats 
by making issuance and existence of the SSL certificates open to the scrutiny by domain 
owners, CAs, and domain users. CT has three main goals that are listed below: 
o Visibility of the certificate to the owner of that domain [40]. Transparent auditing 
and monitoring system that lets the domain owner or CA determine the 
maliciousness or wrongly issuance of the certificate. 
o To protect users from being duped by malicious and mistakenly issued certificates. 
Certificate Transparency is an open framework [41] allowing anyone to build or access 
the basic component of the framework making it possible to achieve the above-mentioned 
goals. CT open framework consists of three main components [41], which are described 
below: 
o Certificate logs are simple network services that maintain cryptographic 
assurance, auditing and append-only logs of the certificates. Anyone can submit 
these logs but certificate authorities are foremost submitters. Like submitting the 
logs, anyone can query the log for cryptographic proof, which can be used to 
verify logging of the particular certificate and/or that the log is behaving correctly. 
o Monitors are running servers that keep watch on the validity and authenticity of 
the certificates. These servers periodically contact the log servers and keep a check 
on malicious certificates. For example, monitors can tell if any unauthorized 
certificate has been issued for the domain or if there are some issues with the 
certificate i.e. unusual certificate extensions or strange permissions. 
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o Auditors are software components that are used to inspect the status and 
authenticity of the logs and the certificates. They have two functions to perform: 
o They have to check the behavior of the logs i.e. verify if the logs are 
working in a correct manner and are cryptographically consistent. If there 
is any ambiguity in the logs, then the log will need to explain it or 
otherwise will face a risk of being shut down. 
o They should check the availability of a particular log in the log file. This 
is particularly important because Certificate Transparency framework 
requires all the certificates to be registered in the log [41]. If the particular 
certificate has no information in the log file, then the client considers it as 
a bogus or suspected certificate and the TLS client may refuse the 
connection with such websites. 
Auditors can be standalone or can be a secondary function of a monitor. Auditors 
and monitors can also communicate with each other in order to exchange 
information about the logs. This helps both to detect forked logs [42]. A single 
person or a certificate authority can run the Auditors, but it is more likely the CAs 
that run the bulk of all auditors. 
All these components together, create an open framework that provides somehow the 
observance of the authenticity of the newly issued and existing SSL certificates in real 
time. 
Certificate transparency when implemented helps in providing protection against several 
certificate-based threats, including wrongly issued certificates, misused certificates, and 
rogue certificates. The effects of these threats are far ranging and may increase financial 
liabilities for the owners and users. Because of these, Internet users may face several 
attacks such as web spoofing, man-in-the-middle attacks etc. 
Certificate Transparency provides solutions to these problems and secures Internet users 
from hijacking. Because of its open framework feature which allows publicly run 
monitors and auditors. CT provides several benefits over the current SSL certificate 
system. These benefits include: 
o Early detection of wrongly issued or malicious and bogus certificates. 
o A faster solution to the problem as soon as the malicious certificate is 
detected. 
o Transparent TLS/SSL system. 
As a solution, CT provides security from the top to the bottom [41] of the pyramid i.e. 
from the CAs all the way down to the end users, making the connection more secure and 
reliable and less prone to attacks and thus allows safer browsing for the users.  
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5. Experiments using Tor SNI proxy 
This chapter describes the work carried out throughout this thesis. Some of the figures in 
this chapter describe the working of components theoretically but their behavior has also 
been checked with practical implementation and analyzing the result. 
5.1 TorSNIP 
As the earlier topic discusses the significance of Tor and shows how drastically Tor has 
increased its number of users in the previous few years, but still there is a huge number 
of users who do not use Tor. One of the many reasons is that they cannot install a separate 
tool for accessing some limited content that is available on Tor’s hidden service and even 
if they want to access any Clearnet domain, they had to wait a little bit more as compared 
to regular Internet surfing. There can be many other issues as well; for example, the 
domain name confusion. Onion addresses are quite different from regular URIs. One of 
the services discussed in the early topics is Tor2Web proxy that helps in providing the 
hidden service content over the regular Internet browser. During the previous research, it 
has also been observed that while accessing the Tor hidden service from some other 
means e.g. Tor2Web in this scenario except Tor browser bundle, the communication is 
not found to be end-to-end secure. It is quite evident that the eavesdropper observing the 
channel, clearly sees the information exchanged between the sender and the receiver. As 
a result, the user’s requests forwarded through Tor2Web instances are at risk of different 
attacks. 
The main reason behind this issue is that when an intermediate proxy server (Tor2Web in 
current scenario) forwards the user’s request to the targeted hidden service, it decrypts 
the HTTPS packet and creates the onion circuit. Decrypting the HTTPS packet and 
relaying that to the targeted hidden service would lead to insecure communication. It is 
the same as two parties communicating with each other openly, such that anyone who 
wishes to hear their communication can easily listen to them. Keeping in mind the users, 
who are not using the Tor browser bundle and still get access to the hidden service, 
without compromising on the security of the data, could require a potential solution to the 
problem. 
Rather than decrypting the HTTPS packet at the intermediate node, it is better to make an 
HTTPS connection directly to the onion site (HS). Server Name Indication (SNI) can be 
the solution to this identified problem. The purpose of this SNI SSL header would be to 
provide the name of the server during the TLS handshake process. Once the server name 
is identified during the handshake process and the SNI header indicates that the user is 
trying to reach the hidden service, the packets will be further forwarded to the backend 
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hidden service, which will have an SSL listener there. This way the user who is not using 
the Tor browser bundle would be able to reach the targeted hidden service using the 
Clearnet domain. The communication, therefore, will be end-to-end encrypted and the 
eavesdropper will not be able to identify communication exchanged. 
Server Name Indication (SNI) is an extension of the TLS protocol and its purpose is to 
indicate the ‘hostname’ to be contacted before the TLS handshake process begins. This 
way, a single IP address may host multiple domain names with multiple certificates. This 
broadens the concept of single IP, single domain, and given a new concept of single IP, 
multiple domains, which makes it cheaper to have multiple domains. 
In a traditional TLS handshake process (a), the client requests a certificate from the server. 
Once the client receives the certificate provided by the server, the client examines the 
certificate and matches with the one it was looking for. If a match occurs, the connection 
proceeds normal, else, the client’s browser shows a warning message of the mismatch 
certificate and the connection may terminate. With the addition of the SNI header (b), 
now the client may request the specific certificate from the server. For example, if the IP 
address (server) is hosting three websites say ‘site1’, ‘site2’, and ‘site3’, the client will 
specifically mention the site it is requesting from the server. The server will forward the 
specified certificate to the client. If the received request has no name mentioned, the 
server may forward the default certificate to the client. 
 
Figure 5.1 (a): Certificate request by client PC (without SNI) 
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Figure 5.1 (b): Certificate request by client PC (with SNI header) 
5.2 Experiments Setup 
To accomplish the goal, the work is divided into three experimental tasks. Each 
experiment is linked with its successor until the final result is achieved.  
5.2.1 Experiment 1: Basic Setup with Multiple Virtual Hosts in 
Apache 
The literature related to the thesis topic i.e. Tor, HS, and Tor2web is reviewed during the 
early stage of the work. The literature was more about the working of Tor and HS as well 
as the basic configuration of these. The tools are chosen during this stage on which the 
actual implementation had to be carried out. Besides this, the knowledge related to the 
web server, domain name, and client/server communication has been gained. This has 
made the base of the work and cleared the basic concepts about the Thesis. Once done, a 
block diagram has been made to make the picture of the work clearer as shown in fig (a). 
Then a small prototype has been made to test the basic functionality. 
Since the requirement of the thesis work is to have a client and server (HS) interaction 
using the Tor network, so, for that, a separate VPS has been reserved (a server with a 
static IP). To make use of the VPS, a domain name is registered and the DNS pointed 
towards the VPS. Initial client/server interaction scenario uses Apache web server. Now, 
the default Apache web page is accessible over the regular Internet. 
To have multiple domain names on a single IP address, Apache offers Virtual Host 
support. Apache offers VH with different features for example; Name based VH, IP based 
VH etc. In this thesis, Name based VH with different ports has been used i.e. different 
domain names are on different ports.  
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Figure 5.2: Apache Virtual Host 
5.2.2 Experiment 2: TLS SNI proxy testing with Apache 
As the main theme of the thesis work is to get access to the HS from the regular Internet 
without compromising security at the intermediate proxy, so, for that Tor’s HS is required 
to be configured, which is done and tested during this stage. Since Apache’s VH is 
working now, Dlundquist SNI proxy code is added to the implementation [43]. The 
default SNI configuration file is modified and is scripted according to the requirements 
of the project, shown in the appendix. 
Apache’s default ports 80 and 443 have been disabled after running the SNI proxy code. 
The SNI proxy at this stage listens on port 80 and 443, which forwards and receives the 
user’s request using these ports. For example, if one domain name is configured on port 
8080 and the other is configured at port 8090, the SNI configuration script will have their 
names with the port numbers, which will listen to the user’s request on the default port 80 
and forwards this request to the respective nameserver and port number. The client will 
be able to access the domain names at the default ports 80 & 443. 
 
Figure 5.3 (a): SNI proxy is handling HTTP traffic at port 80 
To have HTTPS on each of the domain names, a digital certificate is requested from Let’s 
Encrypt CA which provides the authorization that the visited domain(s) is legitimate. One 
thing to be noted here is that to have a certificate for the domain, it must have its VH in 
Apache. If there is no VH found in the Apache, the certificate will not be issued. Another 
important thing here is that, before requesting the certificate, it is better to disable SNI 
proxy during that time and enable Apache’s default ports i.e. 80 & 443. This way, there 
will be fewer chances of getting some errors or getting the request denied from the LE 
server. 
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Figure 5.3 (b): SNI proxy is handling both HTTP & HTTPS traffic at default ports 
Once the certificates are issued to the domains, SNI is enabled again and the domains are 
tested. At this stage, it has been observed that the desired certificate is issued to the client 
on its request from the server, otherwise, the client will get a certificate warning and the 
request will unable to proceed further. 
5.2.3 Experiment 3: Approaching target Hidden Service using 
TorSNIP 
Now, since the base of the network has been laid down, the next step is to forward the 
user’s request to the targeted HS. The idea behind this approach is that the user could be 
able to reach the HS through the Clearnet domain with a regular Internet browser, rather 
than the Tor browser. In this thesis work, HS is configured on a separate virtual machine 
so that the user’s request from the Clearnet domain could be relayed to the HS. 
Onion address is the hash of the public key and is 16-characters long, which includes 
alphabets between ‘a’ to ‘z’ and numbers between ‘0’ to ‘7’ [44]. Since the onion 
addresses don’t have ‘Top Level Domain (TLD)’, it is not yet possible to have domain 
validated certificates for these addresses from any well-known CA. The 16-character 
onion address is appended with the Clearnet domain name and a separate VH has been 
configured in Apache. This domain:onion pair made it possible to have a separate domain 
validated certificate from LE CA. 
Now, once the certificate is issued to the domain:onion address pair, the next step is to 
relay the packets to the targeted HS. Delegate proxy is used to delegate the packets to the 
targeted HS. It also allows choosing a listening port on which the whole communication 
will take place.  
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Figure 5.4: Packet is delegated to HS 
The results are tested with the domain ‘testnetwork1.tk’ until SNI proxy. Later, the onion 
address of the HS is appended with the regular domain name 
‘hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk’ and obtained a certificate for it. 
5.3 Scenario 1 (without MITM) 
Pinning techniques as discussed earlier are very useful techniques in order to make the 
intermediate proxies reliable and trustworthy for the users. These scenarios elaborate the 
importance of using pinning techniques.  
Day one; the user connects to the website (hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk) and 
validates that the website has a valid certificate. It also validates the authenticity of the 
certificate signed by one of the well-known Intermediate or Root CAs. The browser 
accepts the certificate if signed by some well-known Intermediate or Root CA. 
 
Figure 5.5 (a): Certificate & PIN is authenticated and accepted 
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Next, it checks that the website (hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk) is publishing a 
Public-Key-Pinning set and it has a different PIN for each certificate. Then it makes sure 
that one of these PINs should match the one in the Certificate. If it found any one of the 
PIN set matchings, the user connects to the website securely and the browser will 
remember the PIN for the next connection. 
For example, if the user connects to the website the next day, the browser will verify the 
website's certificate in the same manner as it did previously. This time since the browser 
already has the PIN set stored from the previous connection, so it will check the stored 
PIN with the one in the certificate. If it found the matching, the connection successfully 
establishes, and the user may surf the website securely.  
5.4 Scenario 2 (with MITM) 
Let’s say, at some other day a hacker is successful in taking control over the CA and starts 
issuing rogue certificates to the clients. The same user who had used the website 
(hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnework1.tk) previously a few days ago, again wants to connect 
to the website now. The client’s browser will again try to validate the certificate provided 
by the web server. The browser sees some unsecured CA (compromised CA) signs the 
certificate issued to testnetwork1.tk and that unsecured CA is in the list of its trust store, 
therefore the browser will find everything good and will happily accept the certificate and 
moves forward. 
Next, the client’s browser will see that the website also has the Public-Key-Pinning policy 
applied and it also sees that the PIN set is already stored in its database, so it will try to 
validate those stored PINs with the one in the certificate. It tries to match the first PIN 
with the domain level certificate PIN. Since there is no match found, it checks the same 
PIN with intermediate CA PIN. It again does not match, so it checks the root CA PIN and 
still it does not find any match. This way, it tries to match all the PIN one by one it had 
stored or cached in the PIN set with the ones in the CA. Since the CA has been 
compromised, the new PIN will not match the one stored in the client’s database, and the 
connection will be refused and the client will get an alert that there is some problem in 
the middle of the connection. Therefore, it is better to try later once the secure connection 
is available and established between the client and the server. 
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Figure 5.5 (b): Rouge certificate provided by MITM & is accepted by the client's browser but PIN mismatch occurs 
This policy keeps the user safe from connecting to malicious websites that have a valid 
certificate and tries to trick the clients by showing that everything is valid and they are 
connecting to the safe website. According to the RFC document [41], the report_URI 
field can be used to send such reports to the server, so that the problem should be checked 
and resolved as soon as possible. The document also recommends that the client can try 
later to connect to the website. 
5.5 Results 
Below are some of the results, gathered after the completion of the implementation part. 
Since the work is in the initial phases, the domain name and the content of the web page 
are kept at a basic level, just to make it sure that the right web page is accessed on the 
user’s request.  
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Figure 6.1 (a): Web page accessed using HTTP without enabling SNI proxy 
At this point, the web page “hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk” is available from the 
Apache server. The SNI proxy is still enabled at this point and the information of the 
website is defined in the SNI proxy script, along with the assigned port number. 
Therefore, since the SNI proxy is listening on port 80 and 443, it forwards the user request 
to the assigned port number in the Apache web server at the backend. Thus, the user gets 
the web page at default port 80 in this scenario rather than the defined port in Apache i.e. 
8083. 
On the left side of the picture, there are two terminal windows. The top one is the terminal 
window of the OS installed on the virtual machine. The machine has Tor and HS installed 
on it. The bottom one is the terminal window of the VPS, towards which the DNS is 
pointing. It has the SNI proxy script but has no Tor or HS installed on this system. It also 
contains the required VH. The bottom terminal also shows the port number on which the 
actual “hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk” virtual host is. 
The picture below is also similar but at this point the secure web page of 
“hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk” is accessed using SNI proxy. Here again, the actual 
VH port is “6443” but the user is able to access it at default HTTPS port 443. The SNI 
proxy script has the information added to it, of the website along with the port number. 
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Figure 6.1 (b): Web page accessed using HTTPS without enabling SNI proxy 
In this picture, the HS “hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.onion” page is shown, which is accessed using 
Tor browser. The Tor HS with “.onion” can only be accessed using Tor browser and not 
through any regular Internet browsers.  
 
Figure 6.1 (c): Tor Hidden Service accessed using Tor Browser 
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To access the HS through a regular Internet browser, this thesis work uses TorSNIP which 
delegates the user’s request to the targeted HS using Clearnet domain name. As shown in 
the picture below, the tunnel created using delegate proxy helps in reaching the HS on the 
regular Internet browser. The channel is still not secure this time because the HS is 
accessed on the default HTTP port 80. 
 
Figure 6.1 (d): Hidden Service is accessed using HTTP after enabling SNI proxy 
In the picture below, the HS is accessed on port 443 using SNI proxy. 
 
Figure 6.1 (e): Hidden Service is accessed using HTTPS after enabling SNI proxy 
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6. Discussion and Technical Analysis 
Tor2web provides an alternative platform to access the onion sites. It acts as a proxy by 
taking the user’s request and forwarding it to the targeted onion site, using the regular 
Internet. The user does not need to have Tor installed on the system, rather Tor2web 
server has it pre-installed. Technically, the Tor2web node takes the request ‘foo.com’ 
from the user and translates it into ‘foo.onion’ over Tor, i.e. the node decrypts the packet 
received from the user’s browser and builds an onion circuit to establish a connection 
with the HS, requested by the user. 
In its own, it provides a great opportunity for the larger audience to reach the HS. It is 
also good for some of the users who do not want to expose any Tor related activity on 
their system. However, Tor2web service is vulnerable to several attacks, including 
alteration of the data and content injecting. Since it is a proxy; everything that passes 
through it will be visible to the intermediate node including URLs, username/password, 
cookies etc.  
As noticed from the above results, the target HS is reachable through the deployment of 
SNI proxy, which helped in forwarding the HTTP and HTTPS packets directly to the 
onion site on two separate virtual ports chosen randomly. The TCP packet is delegated to 
the HS using TCP relay protocol, which relays the communication between the client and 
the server without interpreting the transmission. This makes it possible to forward the 
TCP packet directly to the HS with the help of SNI proxy, which sends the server name 
before the TLS handshake begins. 
One of the main advantages of this service is that it reduces the risk of coercive and other 
types of network attacks that occur if the communication is not encrypted at any point 
to/from the HS. Thus, it provides an extra layer of encryption to the user’s data, from the 
user’s browser until termination at the onion site. This allows anonymous publishers to 
provide access to larger audiences, without any fear of losing data and user’s privacy. 
Because, when the data to be shared between the client and the server is wrapped in an 
extra layer of encryption i.e. HTTPS, the eavesdropper will not able to identify the 
communication that is done. 
To enhance the security of the service and the user’s trust, it is also possible to use some 
pinning techniques e.g. HPKP and HSTS as used in this thesis work. These techniques 
help in preventing man-in-the-middle attacks by mitigating fake certificates and forcing 
the browser to use HTTPS to communicate with the server instead of HTTP. 
From the viewpoint of proxy operator this could be very helpful to increase the user’s 
trust in their proxy so that more and more users rely on their proxy and feel safer in using 
it. The operator has the task to receive the request from the client, read the TLS SNI 
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header without breaching the original content and forwarding it to the targeted HS. Also, 
the operator receives the response from the HS and forwards it back to the client without 
any tampering or content injection. The operator also has to have a gateway open to all 
the hidden services except the ones that are considered illegal including child 
pornography, drug dealer etc. The operator can also take feedback from the clients just in 
case any illegal content is found or can run its own search to identify illegal sites and 
restrict access to such sites.  
On the other hand, scalability issues may arise in such situation because the proxy 
operator has to update the HTTP and HTTPS table entries explicitly by themselves. 
Therefore, it has a separate local database which includes the list of domain:onion 
mapping along with the port number to operate as a public gateway. This increases the 
liability for the proxy operators. 
From the HS operator’s point of view, this service will be an additive advantage in terms 
of freedom of speech. The HS operators could be safer in publishing content and passing 
it to a larger audience.  The proportion of the number of users visiting HS would increase 
and therefore the demand will grow. Moreover, the users will be safer in accessing the 
HS content without the use of any separate software. The HS operators will also be able 
to provide the content to the users without any risks of running Clearnet domain. 
This can be very useful in countries where people are afraid of talking against higher 
officials. Especially, in the middle east during the Gulf crisis, many countries posted 
restrictions on the use of the Internet, including social media websites and communication 
tools. In such situations, many of the users can benefit from using HS and propagate the 
footages and videos to the people who are otherwise restricted from viewing such content 
by the government. 
Beside several advantages of the service, there are some limitations as well. Although the 
link is secure using HTTPS, still the middleman could be able to retrieve some 
information e.g. user’s geographical location and the website visited. This could be 
helpful in analyzing the activity of the user. Besides that, the HS operator would have to 
share their personal information with the CA before issuing the certificate for their 
website. This leaks information about the HS in the common name field. Therefore, it is 
always recommended to use Tor browser to access the HS in order to achieve the 
maximum level of end-to-end anonymity. 
Besides security and privacy, another important part is the number of servers that are up 
and running at the same time. If there is only a single server, providing services to the 
user, it is quite possible that the service may be interrupted due to maintenance or 
unavailability of the server. The servers could be distributed evenly around the globe so 
that the majority of users could get access to available services without interruption.  
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Like holding a CA and issuing a rogue certificate, there is another attack called coercion 
attack which is a far worse attack than the one discussed earlier. Coercion attack is the 
one in which the attacker takes control of the main system and forces the target to give up 
the cryptographic credentials or keys. The system in this case scenario could be the proxy 
server that is handling user requests for reaching HS. The attacker forces the proxy 
operator to hand over the sensitive information or the keys to decrypt the information or 
otherwise punishes the operator. Use of ephemeral keys limits the attack of stealing the 
keys because these are short-lived keys, therefore, the main target of the attacker would 
be stealing the sensitive information.  
There is another situation in which the attacker sits in between the CA and the proxy. 
Therefore, controlling both the CA and the proxy, which could be the worst threat model 
because the attacker will be issuing the rogue certificates and manipulating the data at the 
same time. 
One of the possible solution to handle this situation is to implement Pinning techniques 
HSTS and HPKP as discussed above. The generated PIN will be stored in the client’s 
browser and as soon as the PIN mismatches, the client gets alert and stops communicating 
using the proxy. The client who is communicating for the very first time will not have the 
PIN stored in the browser, therefore, there is more chance of the client getting trapped. 
One thing can be done is that the client who has the PIN can propagate to other clients 
that the proxy is under attack and therefore avoid communicating through it. This will 
help the clients who are connecting with the proxy for the first time and does not have 
any PIN stored in their browser from previous session. 
Another possible method against this kind of attacks is to use bots that can scan the 
systems integrity and update the administrator immediately. It can make harder for the 
outsider to gain access to the system. Although it cannot prevent the system from attacks 
such as DDoS, but it can be an asset if used correctly. 
Besides coercion attack there are many other network attacks that can help eavesdroppers 
and hackers gain access to the system. For example, spoofing, session hijacking, cookie, 
and traffic flow analysis. Use of Tor protects the user from a common form of internet 
surveillance attack called “traffic analysis” by protecting both the content of the message 
and the header information that identifies sender and receiver.  
TorSNIP proxy implements various security features including HSTS and HPKP which 
enhances the security of the system and increases the trust level of the users. In 
comparison to Tor2web proxy, TorSNIP is more efficient in terms of exchanging 
information with the HS and is also secure enough to build user trust on the proxy. 
TorSNIP also keeps the user data end-to-end secure from the browser until termination to 
HS. This lowers the risk of message tampering or manipulation during the message 
exchange. 
41 
 
Below is a comparison table with list of threats the proxy services can face and comments 
whether the service is secure or not. 
Table 1: Security Considerations 
List of Threats Tor2web TorSNIP 
Content impersonation No Yes 
Traffic Analysis No Yes 
Coercive threats No Yes 
DDoS No No 
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7. Conclusion 
Tor network provides a platform for the users to route packets through nodes that only 
get limited information about the packet. Each node in the Tor network only has 
information about its predecessor and successor nodes thus, hiding the source and 
destination of the packet. The end node may leak some information only if the destination 
is on the regular Internet, but the use of secure channel HTTPS would limit that risk too. 
If the destination is the HS which resides inside the Tor network, then end-to-end 
anonymity could also be achieved with the use of Tor browser. 
A limited number of users access the HS because of its dependency on Tor browser which 
is one of the many reasons. To access the hidden content through a regular Internet 
browser, Tor2web provides services at the risk of compromising the privacy of both the 
user and the HS. The information exchanged through Tor2web proxy is at risk to a man-
in-the-middle attack. The risk could also include injecting the additional content as well 
as modification of the original content. 
TorSNIP addresses these issues and eliminates them by the use of SNI proxy. TorSNIP 
does not decrypt the received packets at the intermediate node, rather forwards it directly 
to the target HS. This limits the risk of different attacks mentioned above and makes the 
communication end-to-end secure. Since, in the earlier scenario, the HS does not have an 
IP address, therefore scalability issues could arise. With the use of SNI proxy, multiple 
HS can link with a single IP address, which enhances the scalability of the HS. 
The current prototype is a testing prototype and can be enhanced, developed, and 
deployed for the larger networks. Docker could be one of the tools that can be used to 
merge different processes, including different virtual hosts, certificates, and packet 
delegation. This could make the work deployment faster and easier. This could also make 
the process more dynamic rather than static i.e. the information in the SNI script could be 
updated dynamically, which makes it useful for the larger network. 
Currently, only the text data has been observed, that has been retrieved from the HS. In 
the future, besides expanding the network, research can also be done on handling metadata 
including multi-media files (audio, video). It could also be analyzed, whether a single 
proxy could handle all the metadata or a separate proxy would be required to handle multi-
media data.   
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APPENDIX. SNI Script 
 user daemon   
2   pidfile /var/run/sniproxy.pid   
  
4   # loaded from /etc/resolv.conf  
resolver { mode ipv4_only } 
 
  
    
6  error_log {  
 syslog daemon 
priority notice 
} 
  
     
8   
     
10  
# HTTP 
listen 80 { 
 proto http 
table http_hosts 
reuseport yes 
} 
  
# HTTPS 
listen 443 { 
proto tls 
table https_hosts 
} 
    
12        
    
14      
table http_hosts {  
 #hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk 127.0.0.1:8083 # Apache         
 hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk 127.0.0.1:7080 # Delegate 
} 
  
16         
 
18   
       
    
 
20   
    
 
table https_hosts {        
 #hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk 127.0.0.1:6443 # Apache (HTTPS) 
hwboe2ozfcsn6n55.testnetwork1.tk 127.0.0.1:8443  # Delegate (HTTPS) 
} 
  
       
 
22   
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